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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
NOTES & COMMENTS
AMORTIZATION OF NONCONFORMING USES
One of the most serious problems facing municipal
planners today is the elimination of nonconforming uses-
uses legally in existence at the date of passage of a zoning
ordinance.' Most commonly these result from the zoning
of a particular district containing one or more existing com-
mercial uses for exclusive residential use. Nonconforming
uses are in direct contradiction to the purposes of a com-
prehensive zoning ordinance2 and are "an admitted cause
of residential and commercial slums, traffic congestion, and
other indicia of urban obsolescence .... 8
From the outset the underlying theory of zoning authori-
ties has been that nonconforming uses must be terminated.
However, early zoning enabling statutes specifically allowed
nonconforming uses to continue. The reason for inclusion of
of such provisions was twofold: first, it was thought that
nonconforming uses would gradually disappear as a result of
normal processes of attrition; and secondly, "even prospec-
tive zoning, in its early days, rested on a rather tenuous
constitutional basis, and the addition of a retrospective
effect might, it was feared, cause the whole structure of
zoning to buckle under the force of due process." 4
'A nonconforming use may be defined as "a use of property in
existence on the effective date of a municipal zoning ordinance,
which use does not comply with the statute .... ." Young, The
Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 W. RES.
L. REv. 681, 685 (1961).
2 "Such incompatible uses often result in inconveniences and
undesirable circumstances such as increased and noisier traf-
fic, unpleasant odors, polluted air and water, increased noise
generally, diminished aesthetic appearance, and decreases in
property values .... [A) deviance from this uniformity, in the
form of an incompatible use or structure, must necessarily beinimical to the avowed objects of zoning." Graham, Legislative
Techniques For The Amortization Of The Nonconforming Use:
A Suggested Formula, 12 WAyN L. REV. 435 (1966).
3 Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20
LAw & CoTavp. PROB. 305 (1955).
4 Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 323 (1962).
[Vol. 4, No. I
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The early theorists' optimism regarding the gradual
disappearance of nonconforming uses has proved to be
unfounded. There has, instead, been a tendency for non-
conforming uses to flourish and even increase in number
for the following two reasons: 6 (1) prospective zoning
ordinances prohibit additional similar uses in the proximity,
thus creating a monopolistic position from which the owner
will not retreat; and (2) boards of zoning appeal have often
abused their power in granting variances, each of which
results in a new nonconforming use.
That a prospective zoning ordinance is a valid exercise
of the police power and not a deprivation of property without
due process of law was put to rest forty years ago by Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' in which Justice Suther-
land made the following statement regarding police power:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple;
but with the great increase and concentration of popula-
tion, problems have developed, and constantly are
developing, which require, and will continue to require,
additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupa-
tion of private lands in urban communities. Regulations,
the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied
to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now
uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a cen-
tury ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary
and oppressive... [Wihile the meaning of constitutional
guaranties never varies, the scope of their application
must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field
of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible
that it should be otherwise."
Thus, the cornerstone of comprehensive zoning legislation
was laid with a rather far-seeing interpretation of the inter-
relationship of the police power, property rights, and due
process of law as they applied to a rapidly expanding urban
society.
5 Metzenbaum, Zoning, Ch. X-g at 1211 (2d ed. 1955).
6 Comment, 35 VA. L. REv. 348, 353 (1949).
7 272 U.S. 365 (1926).8 Id. at 386-87.
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Legislative resolution of the conflict between the possi-
bility of perpetually existing nonconforming uses and the
desire for uniformity in land utilization which forms the
objective of comprehensive zoning was initially approached
very carefully because of a fear of unconstitutionality.
Though by and large no effort was made to abate the non-
conforming uses, restrictions were placed on them with an
intent to accelerate their demise. Typically, in determining
whether or not a nonconforming use had been established,
courts strictly required that there be an actual use as dis-
tinguished from the bare possession of a building permit.
Similarly, a nonconforming use may not be extended, and
and once abandoned, cannot be revived. Destruction of
the premises results in termination of the nonconforming
use, and one nonconforming use cannot be substituted for
another. The combination of these restrictions and the
passage of time has not, however, proved successful in
eliminating nonconforming uses in the majority of cases.
A more direct approach has been followed in some juris-
dictions by using the power of eminent domain to remove
nonconforming uses.10 It has not proved to be particularly
successful and has been criticized because eminent domain:"
(1) requires too much red tape; (2) is too expensive;
and (3) might be unconstitutional for lack of a public
purpose. Although there appears to be little question today
that the use of eminent domain is a constitutional method for
elimination of nonconforming uses, its utilization has not
been extended.
The doctrine of nuisance has also been used to eliminate
nonconforming uses in some instances.12 Classically, to
invoke the doctrine of nuisance, there must have been a
noxious use of the subject property, but this often is not
the case with a nonconforming use. Although the utilization
9 Annot., 87 A.L.R. 2d 4 (1963).10 See e.g., State ex Tel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton
144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1919).
" Young, supra note 1, at 698-99.12 See e.g., Hadacheck v. Sabastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
[Vol. 4, No. I
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of an expanded nuisance doctrine has been noted, in most
cases it has been stretched beyond recognition and has
added confusion and ambiguity to both the law of nuisance
and nonconforming uses."3
The most widely accepted approach to termination of
nonconforming uses is amortization of the use. It is effected
by passage of an ordinance requiring existing nonconforming
uses to terminate at the end of a reasonable period of time;
thus allowing the user to remain long enough to recoup his
investment, make plans to move to a new location, and
effectuate an orderly relocation. The reasonable period of
time alleviates the undue hardship upon the landowner
which is present with summary abatement and arguably
meets the requirement of due process of law.
The first adjudications of amortization ordinances were
the Dema Realty Co. cases.'4 These two cases involved a
New Orleans ordinance which required termination of non-
conforming uses within a particular district within a year
of the effective date of the ordinance. The nonconforming
uses were a drug store and a grocery store in a district
which was to be residential. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
upheld the ordinance, and after quoting at length from
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,1 observed the fol-
lowing:
if the village had the authority to create and to maintain
a purely residential district, which the court held it did
have, and if such an ordinance was not arbitrary and un-
reasonable, it follows necessarily that the village was
vested with the authority to remove any business or
trade from the district and to fix a limit of time in which
the same shall be done.1
13 Graham, supra note 2, at 441.
14 State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So.
314 (1929); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168
La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929).
15 Supra note 7.
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, supra note 14, at
-, 121 So. at 617.
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These cases have been cricitzied 17 on the basis that the
court used a theory of nuisance law and that the period of
grace allowed was unreasonably short.
Another important case is that of Jones v. City of Los
Angeles."" Los Angeles had a zoning ordinance providing
it to be unlawful not only to establish, but also to operate
any sanitorium for the care and treatment of persons suf-
fering from nervous diseases. In 1927, prior to passage of
the ordinance, the city annexed the Mar Vista District in
which there were four sanitoriums for the treatment of
nervous diseases. The operators of the sanitoriums sought
to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance which would have
required summary abatement of the use. The Supreme Court
of California struck down the ordinance saying: "Our con-
clusion is that where, as here, a retroactive ordinance causes
substantial injury and the prohibited business is not a
nuisance, the ordinance is to that extent an unreasonable
and unjustifiable exercise of police power."' 9
Twenty-four years later the Supreme Court of California
upheld an amortization ordinance in City of Los Angeles v.
Gage.2 0 The case involved a retail plumbing business con-
ducted in the owner's residence, and the use as well of racks,
bins, and stalls for storage of plumbing supplies on an
adjacent lot. The objectionable uses were in existence from
1930 until the passage of the ordinance in 1946. The pertinent
part of the amortization ordinance provides:
(a) The nonconforming use of land shall be discontinued
within five (5) years from June 1, 1946, or within five
(5) years from the date the use became nonconforming,
in each of the following cases: (1) Where no buildings
are employed in connection with such use; (2) where
the only buildings employed are accessory or incidental
to such use; (3) where such use is maintained in con-
nection with a conforming building.21
17 Comment, 31 Mo. L. REv. 280, 288 (1966); Comment, 39 YALE
L. J. 735, 736-37 (1930).18 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930).
19 Id. at- , 295 Pac. at 22.
20 127 Cal. App.2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
21 Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.23 B&C.
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The court distinguished Gage from Jones, supra,'because
of the period of amortization, the substantial injury caused
in Jones, and the fact that the ordinance affected only the
use of land and the nonconforming use of a conforming
building. The court pointed out that:
There would be no object in creating a residential dis-
trict unless there were to be secured to those dwelling
therein the advantages which are ordinarily considered
the benefits of such residence. It would seem to be the
logical and reasonable method of approach to place a time
limit upon the continuance of existing nonconforming
uses, commensurate with the investment involved and
based on the nature of the use; and in cases of noncon-
forming structures, on their character, age, and other
relevant factors.22
The court went on to point out that there was no essential
difference between the requirement that a nonconforming
use be terminated within a reasonable period of time and
the various kinds of other restrictions which have been held
to be constitutional. Furthermore, the court indicated that
the distinction between the termination of a nonconforming
use after a reasonable period of time and the prohibition
of a future use is merely one of degree, and the constitu-
tionality of the means is dependent on the relative importance
given to public gain and private loss. As to due process, the
court said:
The elimination of existing uses within a reasonable time
does not amount to a taking of property nor does it
necessarily restrict the use of property so that it cannot
be used for any reasonable purpose. Use of a reasonable
amortization scheme provides an equitable means of
reconciliation of the conflicting interests in satisfaction
of due process requirements.2
Essentially, to determine whether a particular amortiza-
tion ordinance is constitutional, the California court would
determine whether or not it was a reasonable exercise of
22 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, supra note 20, at , 274
P.2d at 43.
2sId. at -, 274 P.2d at 44.
19671
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the police power, in view of the time allotted for termination
of the nonconforming use, and the balance between the gain
of the public and the loss to the individual.
Also upholding an amortization ordinance is Standard
Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee,24 a case involving a gasoline
service station across from the main entrance to the State
Capitol of Florida. Plaintiff purchased the property and con-
structed its service station in 1938 at which time the opera-
tion of service stations was permitted by the zoning ordi-
nance in effect. In 1939 the city adopted an ordinance
whereby all locations used for motor vehicle service stations
within the particular district were to be discontinued in ten
years. Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the City from enforcing
the ordinance at the end of the period of grace, but the
court upheld the ordinance as a reasonable exercise of the
police power. In a rather perfunctory fashion the court noted
that it was established in Florida that a city by ordinance
could require the discontinuance of an existing property
use. The following is illustrative of the court's rationale:
Here, plaintiff's service station is near the State Capitol
and the State Supreme Court Building, as well as several
other state office buildings and a public school. It there-
fore becomes manifest that its discontinuance under the
ordinance cannot be viewed as arbitrary and unreason-
able, or as having no relation to the safety and general
welfare of the community affected .... [Clonsiderations
of financial loss or of so-called "vested rights" in private
property are insufficient to outweigh the necessity for
legitimate exercise of the police power of a municipality.25
Little insight was given into what constitutes a reasonable
exercise of police power as would appear to have been
desirable. A strong dissenting opinion was registered and
the following scathing language denotes its character:
even in this age of enlightenment the Constitution still
protects the citizen against arbitrary and unreasonable
24-183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950); contra, Standard Oil Co. v. City
of Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W.2d 960 (1932).25Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, supra note 24, at 413.
[Vol. 4, No. I
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action, I am in no doubt that in sustaining this admittedly
confiscatory ordinance, a good general principle, the
public interest in zoning, has been run into the ground,
the tail of legislative confiscation by caprice has been
permitted to wag the dog of judicial constitutional pro-
tection.23
The New York courts faced retroactive zoning in People
v. Miller 7 where a nonconforming use consisted of harbor-
ing pigeons; a use developed prior to enactment of a pro-
hibitory zoning ordinance. The court upheld the ordinance
as valid and laid down the following rule:
existing nonconforming uses will be permitted to con-
tinue, despite the enactment of a prohibitory zoning
ordinance, if, and only if, enforcement of the ordinance
would, by rendering valueless substantial improvements
or businesses built up over the years, cause serious
financial harm to the property owner. This rule, with
its emphasis upon the pecuniary and economic loss, is
clearly inapplicable to a purely incidental use of
property for recreational or amusement purposes only.28
Six years later the New York court was faced with
Harbison v. City of Buffalo 29 which did not represent such
an inconsequential use of property. Here the property owner
had operated his business in a 30-x-40-foot frame building
since 1924. In 1953 the controlling zoning ordinance was
amended, requiring all junk yards to cease or, in the altern-
ative, conform to the designated residential use within three
years from the effective date of the ordinance. The court
upheld the ordinance with two judges constituting the major-
ity, two judges concurring on the basis of People v. Miller,
supra, and three judges dissenting.30 The opinion of the court
28 Id. at 414.
27 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
28 Id. at - , 106 N.E.2d at 36.
29 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958).
80 One author has suggested that "it is doubtful if the Court of
Appeals as a whole intended to move too far away from that
decision [People v. Miller] and its fundamental principle that
a prior nonconforming use can be terminated only where it is
insubstantial." Note, 44 CoRmLL L.Q. 450, 457 (1959).
19671
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with regard to nonconforming structures was that if the
amortization period was reasonable in relation to the useful
life of the structure, the amortization ordinance was con-
stitutional. To determine what that period should be the
court indicated: "In ascertaining the reasonable period
during which an owner of property must be allowed to con-
tinue a nonconforming use, a balance must be found between
social harm and private injury."3 1 Thus, in determining
constitutionality, the court would apply a balancing test
similar to that propounded in City of Los Angeles v. Gage.82
Dissenting in Harbison, Judge Van Voorhis heaped
criticism on what he considered to be a taking of property
without compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, quoting an earlier New York case as saying "it is
argued that what used to be called confiscation is justifiable
in an enlightened age, if enough people desire it, and the
amount to be taken away from the owner is not too great."38
The dissent recommended as a solution to the problem that
"if this part of the city is to be redeveloped, it should be
done through the enactment of a statute similar in principle
to slum clearance acts, whereby just compensation can be
paid for private property that is confiscated for a public
use.)34
Although it is not clear as to all circumstances to which
it is applicable, New York will under some circumstances
uphold amortization ordinances.
Another significant case upholding amortization of non-
conforming uses is Grant v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore,3 5 an action by certain signboard companies and
31 Harbison v. City of Buffalo, supra note 29, at , 152
N.E.2d at 46-47.32 Supra note 20.
33 Inc. Village of No. Homell v. Rauber, 181 Misc. 546, 552, 40
N.Y.S.2d 938, 944 (1943).
34 Harbison v. City of Buffalo, supra note 29, at , 152
N.E.2d at 51.
35 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
[Vol. 4, No. I
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their lessors against the City of Baltimore to restrain the
enforcement of zoning ordinance. The ordinance required
elimination of all billboards located in residential districts
within five years after its enactment. The Supreme Court
of Maryland held that it was within the legislative power
of the city to pass an amortization ordinance:
Having determined the harm to the public welfare,
the Council undoubtedly concluded that an equitable
means of reconciling the conflicting interests of the pub-
lic on the one hand, and those of advertising companies
and those leasing land to them on the other, and thus the
satisfaction of the requirements of due process, would
be a five year amortization period. We cannot say that
the remedy chosen was arbitrary, nor that the City
Council was wrong in its conclusion that the effect for
good on the community by the elimination of billboards
within five years would far more than balance individual
losses.36
Not all of the recent decisions have supported retroactive
zoning ordinances. In City of Corpus Christi v. Allen,3T the
Supreme Court of Texas held an ordinance restraining auto-
mobile salvage yards from continuing their business to be
unconstitutional. The period of grace allowed in which to
terminate the nonconforming use was two years. The
reasoning of the court was not unlike that of other courts
upholding amortization ordinances:
We hold that to exercise the power attempted here would
be unreasonable because any benefit to petitioner by its
exercise would undoubtedly be relatively very small;
respondents would be forced to move from a "light"
industrial district, where adjoining uses, admittedly legal,
such as second-hand furniture stores, garages and the
like, are not substantially out of harmony with, or dif-
ferent from, the uses petitioner would force respondents
to quit .... 3 8
36 Id. at - , 129 A.2d at 372.
87 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953).
38 Id. at - , 254 S.W.2d at 761.
19671
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This appears to be the same type of balancing of interests
test applied in other cases of this nature; only here, the court
found that the balance was such that the ordinance was
arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to these property
owners. The Texas court left the door open for future cases
with the statement:
Our conclusion is not to be construed as a holding that
the ordinance in question may not, under other circum-
stances, be invoked to terminate a non-conforming use,
not a nuisance nor injurious to the public health, morals,
safety or welfare.3 9
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Village of
Oak Park v. Gordon40 did not totally reject amortization
in dealing with an ordinance which would require a non-
conforming boarding house to reduce the number of roomers
to two within five years. The property owner had a con-
forming structure, but had been renting to four roomers
for some time prior to the passage of the ordinance. After
analyzing the interests of the public and the individual the
court concluded that an ordinance which sought to deprive
an individual of a nonconforming use without any apparent
public need was unconstitutional. However, they qualified
this by stating:
In so holding we do not intend to express any opinion
as to the validity of this or other amortization ordinances
as applied to other properties. Each case must be judged
upon the particular facts of that case with due considera-
tion given to the respective interests of the public and
the individual property owners.41
An Ohio amortization ordinance was held to be uncon-
stitutional in City of Akron v. Chapman,42 There the owner
and his predecessor in title had operated a junk yard on the
89 City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, supra note 37, at
254 S.W.2d at 761.
40 32 Ill.2d 295, 205 N.E.2d 464 (1965).
41 Id. at - , 205 N.E.2d at 466.
42 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).
[Vol. 4, No. I
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subject property since 1916. In 1922 the city passed an
ordinance providing that a nonconforming use must be dis-
continued and removed when, in the opinion of the city
council, such use has been permitted to exist or continue for
a reasonable period of time. An ordinance was passed in
1950 specifically describing the Chapman property and re-
quiring that it must conform within one year to the resi-
dential nature of the neighborhood. The Ohio Supreme Court
observed that property is the unrestricted right to the use,
enjoyment and disposal of land; and when the right of use
is denied, "the value of property is annihilated and owner-
ship is rendered a barren right."4 3 After thus defining prop-
erty the court held:
The right to continue to use one's property in a lawful
business and in a manner which does not constitute
a nuisance and which was lawful at the time it was
acquired is within the protection of Section 1, Article
XIV, Amendments, Constitution of the United States
... which provides that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.44
Amortization of nonconforming uses was also rejected
by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Hoffman v. Keneay.45
There the pre-existing nonconforming use consisted of the
open storage of lumber, building materials and construction
equipment, and the amortization period provided for in the
ordinance was six years. The court held the ordinance was
unconstitutional since termination of the nonconforming
use pursuant to its authority would "constitute the taking
of private property for public use without just compen-
sation . . . a taking not to be justfied as an exercise of
the police power which is always subject to, and may never
transcend, constitutional rights and limitations."46
As indicated by the cases discussed above, there exists a
great deal of disagreement between the courts as to the con-
43 Id. at - , 116 N.E.2d at 700.44 City of Akron v. Chapman, supra note 42, at , 116
N.E.2d at 700.
45 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965).
Al Id. at 755.
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stitutionality of amortization ordinances in the United States
today.4 7 However, it is submitted that where the benefit
to the public is significant in relationship to the loss to the
individual, and the amortization period is reasonable, such
an ordinance represents a valid exercise of the police power.
It is fundamental that all zoning ordinances must find
their justification in some aspect of the police power, that
is, asserted for the health, safety or welfare of the public. 8
As was pointed out in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,49 the tremendous increase in our population and its
concentration has required and will continue to require ad-
ditional restrictions in the use and occupation of private
land. This is well illustrated by the gradual emergence of
zoning in the fifty years since the first rudimentary com-
prehensive zoning ordinance was passed ° to the highly
sophisticated city planning tool it is today. However, the
ultimate benefit to the public of comprehensive zoning is
undermined by the existence of nonconforming uses, which
although originally expected to disappear, have instead
flourished as a result of their monopolistic nature.
The goal of city planners today is the same as it has been
from the inception of comprehensive zoning-conformance.
In view of public interest in realizing this end, it appears
logical that it can be achieved through a reasonable exercise
of the police power. It has been stated that "every exercise
of the police power is apt to affect adversely the property
interest of somebody."'51 Unlike eminent domain, the inci-
dental injury to an individual does not prevent its operation
as long as it is exercised for the purpose of public health,
safety, morals or general welfare and is not arbitrary or
unreasonable.
47 Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 1146 (1955).48Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 7, at 387.49 1d. at 386.
601 Metzenbaum, Zoning, Ch. 1 at (2d. ed. 1955)
51 Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 512, 234 Pac. 388, 394
(1925).
[Vol. 4, No. 1
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The primary difference between the police power and
the power of eminent domain, aside from the requirement of
the payment of just compensation in the latter, is that in
eminent domain the property is taken from the individual
for the use of the public. In comparison, the application of
the police power is to regulate the use of the property and it
results in an impairment of rights in the property because
the free exercise of these rights would be detrimental to
the public interest.52 An amortization ordinance enacted pur-
suant to the police power does not result in such an extreme
impairment of rights as to constitute a taking which would
require compensation. Rather, it operates to require the
owner of property to conform his use to that of the zoning
district in which he is located as opposed to leaving his
property useless. Although some damage will probably be
suffered by the individual, it has long been recognized that
damage resulting from the proper exercise of the police
power is one of the prices an individual is forced to pay as
a member of society.53
Although regulation of property can be so onerous as to
constitute a taking which requires compensation,54 a prohibi-
tion against the use of property for purposes that are
declared by valid legislation to be injurious to the health,
morals, or safety of the community cannot be deemed a
taking of property for public benefit. The legislation does
not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property
for lawful purposes, nor does it restrict his right to dispose
of it. Instead, it is a declaration by the state that its use by
any one for these purposes is prejudicial to the public
interests.55
When examining an amortization ordinance the courts
should accord to it the presumption of constitutionality that
52 Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 Atl. 354, 356 (1920).
53 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, supra note 20, at , 274
P.2d at 40.
5 4Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
rr Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962).
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is accorded other legislation. The court's function is to de-
termine whether a reasonable basis for the action of the
zoning authority exists, and if the reasonableness of the
ordinance is fairly debatable, the legislative determination
must not be disturbed."
In determining the reasonableness of an amortization
ordinance there are two basic considerations which should
by weighed by the legislative body: (1) the benefit to the
public; and (2) the hardship to the individual. The reason-
ableness of any particular ordinance, of course, is determin-
able only by a review of the particular facts of the case,
but some generalizations as to the public benefit can be
made. Some reasons for excluding buildings devoted to busi-
ness, trade, and similar uses from residential areas are:
promotion of the health and security by safeguarding
children from injury, suppression and prevention of disorder,
faciliating the extinguishment of fires, enforcement of street
traffic regulations" 7 -in short, all of the factors that cumu-
latively create the necessity for any type of comprehensive
zoning.
Examination of the hardship to the individual requires
an anlysis of the amortization ordinance. To minimize the
burden placed on the operator of the nonconforming use,
the period of time granted for the abatement of the use
should approximate the useful life of the structure. If this
is the case, the property owner will be able to amortize the
value of the structure at its normal depreciation rate so
that his effective investment in the property at the end of
the amortization period is the fair market value of the
property in its unimproved state prior to the passage of the
zoning ordinance. Ideally, then, the loss he suffers at the
end of the amortization period is the same loss the owner
of unimproved realty situated for the same use would suffer
if his land were similarly zoned. Two additional factors
which must be taken into consideration are good will and
56 Oklahoma City v. Barclay, 359 P.2d 237 (Okla. 1960).57Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 7, at 391.
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moving expenses. The amortization approach does not re-
lieve the burden of these costs. However, balanced against
the loss of good will and moving expense is the additional
benefit derived from the monopolistic position the property
owner has enjoyed from the date his use became noncon-
forming to the end of the amortization period. From this it
can be seen that where an ordinance is carefully tailored to
the type of nonconforming use in existence, the loss to the
property owner need not be substantial. Thus, where the
balancing test utilized in those cases accepting amortization
as a valid exercise of the police power is used, these ordi-
nances do not work hardships on the individuals to which
they are applied.
Whether or not the particular ordinance is valid depends
upon whether it is a reasonable exercise of the police
power-whether it bears a substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare. In those cases
where such a substantial relation exists, the ordinance will
be a valid exercise of the police power if the amortization
period is reasonable and the benefit to the public outweighs
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